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RATIFICATION IN NORTH CAROLINA*
M. S. BRECKENRIDGE t
The American Law Institute defines ratification as, "... the affirm-
ance by a person of a prior act which -lid not bind him but which was
done or professedly done on his account, whereby the act, as to some
or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him."' This
painstaking definition is probably more accurate than those sprinkled
through texts and cases 2 even though its concluding clause seems for-
eign to the idea of defining, being, as it is, a statement of what ratifica-
tion does when it exists.3 In the physical world, of course, a description
may be aided by just such additions. An elephant is a large, wrinkled,
grey animal which has a trunk and the posterior appearance of wearing
broken suspenders. And which eats peanuts. The eating of peanuts
may in a pinch help to identify the animal. What ratification does,
however, i.e., the effects of ratification, can not be similarly observed
and used to determine if ratification exists since those effects are what
will ensue from a determination from other factors that there is ratifica-
tion.4 Criticism of a definition, however, because it has a dangling,
* This article is not on ratification in agency with special reference to the North
Carolina cases, but is a discussion and criticism of the North Carolina cases alone.
From the standpoint of any broad scholarship, there is, of course, no such thing
as the North Carolina law of ratification in the sense that there are special condi-
tions here justifying an independent body of North Carolina law. And yet there
is some practical advantage in familiarity with the local decisions.
t Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
1 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §82 (hereafter cited as Restatement).
21 MECHEM, LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §347; TIFFANY, AGENCY (2d ed.
1924) 128. Nelson v. Atlanta Home Ins. Co., 120 N. C. 302, 306, 27 S. E. 38, 39
(1897), ". . . subsequent affirmance or adoption of the act of another, or of the
voidable contract of the party himself." Cf. terse statement in Starkweather &
Shepley v. Gravely, 187 N. C. 526, 527, 122 S. E. 297, 298 (1924), apparently
originating in Steffens v. Nelson, 94 Minn. 365, 102 N. W. 871 (1905), and fre-
quently repeated in North Carolina. "The substance of ratification is confirmation
after conduct."
' This incorporates into the definition the gist of the maxim, "omnnis ralihabillo"
etc., variously quoted. Moore v. Rogers, 51 N. C. 297, 299 (1859) ; Rowland v.
Barnes, 81 N. C. 234, 239 (1879) ; Greenleaf v. Norfolk So. R. R., 91 N. C. 33, 37
(1884). See comment on the two common forms of the maxim in TIFFANY,
AGENCY (2& ed. 1924) 129 n. 1. Similar doctrine stated in English in Gallup & Co.,
Inc. v. Rozier, 172 N. C. 283, 289, 90 S. E. 209, 212 (1916).
" By comparison, the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932) §52, in defining ac-
ceptance of an offer-seemingly ratification's closest kin-, appends no correspond-
ing clause concerning effects. "Acceptance of an offer is an expression of assent
to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a manner requested or authorized by
the offeror." It may be that the definition in the Agency Restatentent most nearly
corresponding to that of "acceptance" in the Contracts Restatement, however, is
§83, on "Affirmance", which likewise omits any recital about effects. It may be
also that for practical reasons the appendage is desirable in defining ratification, so
that it may be distinguished from other possible consequences of affirmance, e.g.,
"adoption". (Hence, my concession "possibly useful" in the text above.) Con-
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unrelated-looking, but possibly useful, appendage is not a very worth-
while use of printed space, and it may be that the chief value of men-
tioning definitions here at all, when the state supreme court has gotten
along a century and a half practically without using any, is to note how
trifling a start they provide at best to an understanding of the subject.
Ratification is, in other words, only so far illuminated by definition-
even careful definition-as to be shown to be some kind of approval,
of some kind of prior unauthorized acts, when given by some kinds of
persons in some manner and within some period of time. All the indi-
cated uncertainties must be dealt with later on, after which, and only
after which, will one know much about what the term really means.
That fact provides the task for this discussion.
WHAT ACTS CAN BE RATIFIED?
Such judicial comment on this problem as may be found in North
Carolina deals with it rather simply. Void transactions can not be
ratified, nor can those by which the "principal" could not have obligated
himself had he handled them personally,-if indeed that is not the same
thing. In this classification falls the case of Johnson v. Royster5 wherein
property was listed for taxes for a prior year by an agent who had no
authority so to do, and Justice Ruffin held that listing could not lawfully
be made at all or by anyone for past years, and accordingly refused
to recognize the possibility of ratification as fixing tax liability on the
principal. The same position can be taken on ultra vires contracts of
corporations where the transaction in question is considered ultra vires
in the sense of being illegal and invalid as, e.g., a contract to join in
creating a monopoly." But if ratification in such a case would be in-
parison of the mechanics of reaching the ultimate obligation in Contracts and
Agency discloses this peculiarity in the restatements. Acceptance of an offer
produces the contract. Affirmance of a proper unauthorized act "results in ratifi-
cation" (§83, comment a). Ratification is "the affirmance of a prior act", etc., and
results in liabilities (see §100). In both Contracts and Agency the simple fact is
that assent manifested in certain ways produces legal obligations. The two step
process by which this is described in Agency seems to obscure rather than clarify
the issue. A contract made by an agent "subject to ratification", such as that in
Storey v. Stokes, 178 N. C. 409, 100 S. E. 689 (1919), may'be in fact a case of
offer only and present no problem of ratification.
5 88 N. C. 194 (1883). Formal invalidity of the agent's act will likewise prevent
ratification. Woodcock v. Merrimon, 122 N. C. 731, 30 S. E. 321 (1898).
'See Clark, C. J., dissenting, in Hill v. Atlantic & N. C. R. R., 143 N. C. 539,
601, 55 S. E. 854, 876 (1906). This was the rigid view of many early cases as to
all ultra vires "corporate action". And an occasional unguarded statement to like
effect may still be found. Respess v. Rex Spinning Co., 191 N." C. 809, 133 S. E.
391 (1926) semble. The majority in the Hill case adopted, even as to this contract
with its large questions of policy, the now, prevailing view that most dtra vires
contracts are binding and enforceable. STrMNS, CORPORATIONS (1936) 254, 276.
Corporate contracts made by or to an interested director or officer being voidable
only, are under a rule similar to that governing infant's contracts, infra, p. 311. and
can be effectively ratified. Green River Mfg. Co. v. Bell, 193 N. C. 367, 137 S. E.
132 (1927) ; Highland Cotton Mills v. Ragan Knitting Co., 194 N. C. 80, 88, 138,
19401
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effectual to validate the transaction and make it binding on the parties,
it might still have the effect of creating tort or criminal liability on the
law-breaking corporation since torts and crimes are capable of ratifica-
tion to impose liability. 7 The bare statement that void contracts can not
be ratified is thus seen to be oversimplified and misleading, though
often correct enough as applied to the facts in hand.
When it comes to the contracts of married women and others under
legal disability, the same doctrine has been applied. If the act done on
her behalf by a person having no authority from her is one he could
not have validly done with her authority, or which she could not not
have validly done herself, or if it is one which could only have been
validly done in a form not followed, affirmance by her falls short of
ratification.8  All this seems fairly obvious. Ratification has at most
been thought equal to prior authorization, and what she could not
effectively authorize she could not ratify.
The above has been written of attempted ratification by a woman
S. E. 428, 431 (1927) ; Morris v. The Y. & B. Corp., 198 N. C. 705, 153 S. E. 327(1930), also on ground of authority and estoppel. Contracts to employ unlicensed
persons in certain employments might be illegal and void beyond ratification.
Respess v. Rex Spinning Co., supra, where foreign accountants were held not to
have violated the statute in making one audit, and ratification was accordingly
effective. Cf. as to other contracts contrary to public policy. Waggoner v. Western
Carolina Publishing Co., 190 N. C. 829, 130 S. E. 609 (1925). And, to the effect
that corporate mortgages executed both on insufficient authorization and inadequate
form may not be ratified, at least as against creditors, examine Duke v. Markham,
105 N. C. 131, 10 S. E. 1017 (1890). Cf. Chatham v. Mecklenburg Realty Co.,
174 N. C. 671, 94 S. E. 447 (1917) ; Spence v. Wilmington Cotton Mills, 115 N. C.210, 20 S. E. 372 (1894) ; Jenkins v. Gastonia Cotton Mfg. Co., 115 N. C. 535, 20
S. E. 724 (1894) (no ratification of formally invalid contract after repeal of the
statute which imposed the formal requirement). Cf. also Taylor v. Albemarle
Steam Nay. Co., 105 N. C. 484, 10 S. E. 897 (1890) ; Phillips v. Interstate Land
Co.. 176 N. C. 514, 97 S. E. 417 (1918).
That torts may be ratified was recognized in Moore v. Rogers, 51 N. C. 297(1859) ; Daniel v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 136 N. C. 517, 48 S. E. 816 (1904) ;
Haynor Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 147 N. C. 267, 61 S. E. 54 (1908) (false representations
as to goods sold) ; Starnes v. Raleigh, Char. & So. Ry., 170 N. C. 222, 87 S. E. 43(1915) (same as to use of land purchased) ; Riley v. Stone, 174 N. C. 588, 94 S. E.
434 (1917) (slander); Smith v. Somers, 213 N. C. 209, 195 S. E. 382 (1938). As
to ratification of crimes, State v. Privett, 49 N. C. 100 (1856). As to forgery, see
McNeely case, cited infra note 41. As to liability for trespass later assented to by
the one for whose benefit the trespass was committed, Horton v. Hensley, 73 N. C.
163 (1840).
' Thoipson v. Taylor, 110 N. C. 70, 14 S. E. 513 (1892), where the contract to
build a house on the married woman defendant's land was made by the husband
and his agency was denied. No point was made of ratification in the opinion, but,
by affirming the judgment below, the court approved the trial judge's ruling which
excluded evidence calculated to show ratification by accepting benefits, i.e., livingin the house. Evidently ratification was considered impossible though the court(id. at 73, 14 S. E. at 514) speaks of the -work being done without her authority,
which, taken alone, would suggest that authority or ratification, if either were
shown, would have been significant. Weathers & Crowder v. Borders, 121 N. C.
387, 28 S. E. 524 (1897), though somewhat similar, is probably not an agency case;
and the statement, "She can not ratify a void contract", probably refers to the in-
validity of an oral agreement made by her directly and jointly with her husband,
rather than one by him as agent for her.
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who at the time was still under the same disability which would have
rendered an original authority fruitless. But the case may be presented
in a more complicated form. Suppose the woman to have been married
and incapacitated when the transaction was originally entered into in
her name by the so-called agent, but that now, as a widow and feme sole,
she manifests her approval. So far as new obligations are concerned,
she is a free trader and a present appointment of an agent for like pur-
poses would bind her. Can she effectively bind herself by ratification
of the old unauthorized transaction? The answer is a technical one
and is, "No".0  Ratification relates back, so it is said,' 0 and'the obliga-
tion is then viewed as arising at the time of the agent's act.'"
Whether this is the best rule or not, it is well established and covers
in principle the case of purported agencies for other entirely disabled
persons, as, e.g., those adjudicated insane, of which no instances have
been found in this state.
On the same grounds and a fortiori it is generally held that a cor-
poration can not ratify the acts of promoters done on its behalf before
its incorporation. 1 2 Acts for a then non-existent principal are at least
as shallowly rooted as are those for one disabled. One local case might
at first sight be regarded as in conflict with the rule here stated. In
McNair v. Southern States Finance Company' plaintiff charged the
defendant with responsibility for false representations made by its al-
leged agent in the sale of its stock. One of the representations was
that the company was "then being organized". Had that been true the
judicial observations about ratification' 4 would be open to criticism, but
the jury found that the representations, including this one, were false.
and the act being thus done for a then existent principal could, of
course, be ratified.
The situation as to transactions on behalf of an infant bears a close
relationship to those just considered, but due to the modified character
of an infant's disability in contract law, i.e., that the infant's engage-
ments are not void but voidable, a corresponding rule is recognized as
to ratification. Accordingly, approval given after majority reached will
apparently dispose of both the lack of authority and the voidability due
to lack of full contractual power, i.e., it will effect ratification in both
' Stated as one ground of decision in Rawlings v. Neal, 126 N. C. 271, 275, 35
S. E. 597, 598 (1900). "There can be no ratification of a void transaction." RE-
STATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §84, illus. 7.
"0 Respess v. Rex Spinning Co., 191 N. C. 809, 133 S. E. 391 (1926).
" See analysis in McArthur v. Times Printing Co., 48 Minn. 319, 51 N. W. 216
(1892).2 Though there might be liability on different grounds,--quasi-contract, novation,
adoption, etc. STEvzNs, CoaPoRA ioNs (1936) 187.13 191 N. C. 710, 133 S. E. 85 (1926).
- Id. at 719, 133 S. E. at 90.
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respects.15 The effect given to approval voiced before majority is to
be mentioned in the next topic, "Who Can Ratify ?"
A special state of affairs exists with regard to insurance contracts.
Where taken out by one without authority they may, like other con-
tracts, be ratified by the principal prior to loss. But attempts to ratify
and get the benefit of insurance after loss apparently impress some
courts as a form of depravity not to be encouraged. Superficially it
seems kin to the well-known stage antic of telephoning for coverage
while the fire rages. There is something startling about the golden
opportunity offered for gain through ratification after known loss, but
against this it should not be forgotten that the third party is always
in the exposed position by his own failure to ascertain the agent's
authority, and that he is exposed in all cases of ratification to some loss
since a purported principal will normally ratify only where he considers
the transaction to his advantage. An unauthorized agreement to ex-
change properties may find the alleged principal little interested till he
discovers a change in the market operating in his favor. We would
have a more nearly parallel case to that of ratifying unauthorized in-
surance, however, if we assumed that an uninsured or inadequately
insured building on the principal's lot had burned just before he learned
of the agreement.10 After a thorough examination of cases and the
actual business practices in respect of insurance underwriting, a widely
known author has concluded that ratification should be permitted even
after known loss.1" Our own law, after a period of uncertainty, seems
to have swung around in the direction of this view.
The first case raised the question in interesting backhand fashion,
and was one especially calculated to throw the sympathy of the court
into the scales against the right and power to ratify.' 8 Plaintiff had
fire insurance issued by 'defendant company which by express provision
should be void if plaintiff had or got other insurance, valid or invalid.
He did get another policy, one in a Canadian company (whether before
"1 This doctrine seems to have approval in Flowe v. Hartwick, 167 N. C. 448,
83 S. E. 841 (1914), although there was insufficient evidence of manifested af-
firmance and there were other defects which are to be considered later herein.
Refer also to Smith v. Gray, 116 N. C. 311, 21 S. E. 200 (1895), and Norwood v.
Lassiter, 132 N. C. 52, 43 S. E. 509 (1903) ; neither of them are squarely in point,
one being an irregular sale of infant's lands by commissioners and the other a
similar sale by a mortgage trustee. Sales by such persons in an unauthorized or
illegal manner, however, bear much resemblance to acts of an unauthorized agent
or intermeddler, and the same principle seems to have been thought relevant and
to have been applied where the infants took the proceeds after becoming of age.
a See the rule of the Restatement in the next footnote.
17 Robinson, Ratificationt After Loss in Fire Insurance (1933) 18 CORN. L. Q.
161. The Restatement, §89, is contra, not as a narrow rule of fire or other insurance
law, but as a proposition of general application where material changes in condition
have occurred so as to make it inequitable to hold an unwilling third person. This
is slightly different from the tentative language commented on by Robinson.
"8 Nelson v. Atlanta Home Ins. Co., 120 N. C. 302, 27 S. E. 38 (1897).
[Vol. 18
RATIFICATION IN NORTH CAROLINA
or after the one in suit was issued does not clearly appear), in the sense
that he received and for a time held in possession -a policy issued with-
out any authority from him. He went further than that. After the
fire, he filed a proof of loss on it accompanied by an admission that
he had not authorized its procurement. Failing, of course, to receive
favorable action on that half-hearted and self-defeating claim, he fell
back on what he considered his lawful insurance, only to be met by the
invalidity clause already mentioned. If he were found to have ratified
the Canadian policy his case would be lost. At trial the court seems to
have made no point of ratification specifically, but to have submitted
the issue of second policy or no second policy, elaborated by language
(about plaintiff's accepting another policy) probably amounting to an
issue on ratification in effect if liberally construed. As might be ex-
pected, the jury answered this favorably to the plaintiff. But on appeal
the supreme court seems to have made the question of defendant's con-
duct looking toward ratification entirely immaterial. ". . . it will scarcely
be contended that the assured can, after the property insured has been
destroyed, accept a policy issued without his knowledge or procurement,
and which, at the time of issue, he never intended to accept."'19 Whether
this statement is the law of the case or only dictum might be questioned.
The sentence immediately following is this: "In the absence of any
prayer for fuller instructions, we think the charge sufficient." This
might put the decision on the ground that the jury found against rati-
fication on sufficient evidence and on instructions illuminating enough
to pass unless challenged at trial. There can be no doubt, however,
that the court, without investigation of authorities, held a somewhat
emphatic opinion that there could be no ratification.
Between that case and the one relied upon for the statement above,
that the rule in North Carolina is now otherwise, there were cases not
squarely presenting the issue but which involved issues closely enough
kin to it so that their results might be thought significant. They are
summarized in the margin.20
'
9 d. at 306, 27 S. E. at 39.
"Starkweather & Shepley v. Gravely, 187 N. C. 526, 122 S. E. 297 (1924).
Suit by broker to recover payments made by him on marine insurance he had taken
out for defendant without authority. Shipment had arrived without loss. Jury
finding: no ratification. On appeal, hcld, the cases on ratification after loss in order
to hold the insurer are in conflict (citing Nelson case along with two federal
cases), but that is not the question here. Plaintiff can not complain of the trial
since he could only recover if there had been attempted ratification, and the jury
had found none. Perhaps this does not do justice to the plaintiff's contention which
seemed to call for an issue as to whether defendant had affirmed the contract even
though it would not be effective as ratification. But the case is at least consistent
with the view of no ratification after loss.
Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Atlas Assurance Co., 188 N. C. 747, 125
S. E. 631 (1924). Insurance taken out by mortgagor without the knowledge of
mortgagee, but in its favor "as interest may appear". Argued inter alia that
1940]
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Finally, there came Belk's Department Store v. George Washington
Fire Insurance Company,2 ' where an agent having written several con-
current policies on a large stock of, merchandise for plaintiff, later sub-
stituted a policy of the defendant for one in a company which had become
insolvent. Notice of the substitution was mailed to plaintiff before, but
received after, a destructive fire. The jury found that the parties
entered into this insurance contract (which they might have found either
upon authority or upon ratification), and on appeal a judgment on the
verdict was affirmed. The court, without reference to the seemingly
contrary Nelson case, above, quoted with approval text statements that
ratification could be effective after loss, and apparently rested its de-
cision chiefly on that doctrine. The Jernigan case22 was distinguished
on its facts, but seemingly was approved on its law. It would have
been more satisfactory to have had an obituary notice for the Nelson
case incorporated in this opinion, but probably that is not necessary
despite the two dissents registered without opinion.
WHO CAN RATiFY?
It is obvious that ratification must be either by "the principal" 23 or
by someone authorized to affirm on his behalf. This necessarily includes
ratification by an agent,24 and, in the case of corporations, formal action
to that end is ordinarily by agent rather than by the whole body of the
stockholders who constitute the corporation. 25  It is possible that in
mortgagee can not ratify after loss. Held, case is one of third party beneficiary not
agency, and authority on ratification (Nelson case) not in point.
Jernigan v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 202 N. C. 677, 163 S. E. 762 (1932).
Named defendant had gotten local agent to cancel policy of plaintiff without notice.
Agent then wrote new coverage in another company. New policy sent to mort-
gagee. Fire followed and plaintiff, having declared that she looked to original
insurer, sued both companies. Held, no authority for cancelling old policy and
while authorities (citations are to cases from other jurisdictions) recognize power
to ratify substitution there was no ratification here. This case is the first to take
that position, and while the statement is not made concerning affirmance after loss,
the case was of that sort.21208 N. C. 267, 180 S. E. 63 (1935).
22 See note 20, utpra. On the substitution cases elsewhere see comment of Robin-
son, loc. cit. supra note 17.
.. "The principal" must be taken throughout to mean the intended or purported
principal whether the one acting was in fact his agent (for other but not these
purposes) dr was no agent at all. See Restatement, §87. Similarly as to "the
agent".
"The headnote in Moye v. Cogdell, 69 N. C. 93 (1873), repeated in Bank of
Glade Spring v. McEwen, 160 N. C. 414, 421, 76 S. E. 222, 225 (1912), but with-
out any application to the facts, erroneously states that ratification must be by the
principal and not by his agent, but the opinion only stated that the agent had no
authority (id. at 96), though he was said to be a general agent (id. at 94).
" Respess v. Rex Spinning Co., 191 N. C. 809, 133 S. E. 391 (1926), is a case
of stockholder ratification where the contention was made that the action failed
because of lack of directors' action-a contention possibly sustainable if the transac-
tion in question had been part of the day-to-day business of the corporation as to
which directors are sometimes held supreme. BALLEXTINE, CORPORATIo NS (1927)
§99. Cf. Hill v. Atlantic & N. C. R. R., 143 N. C. 539, 55 S. E. 854 (1906), where
[Vol. 18
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some cases the affirmance might effectively be given by the very person
who theretofore acted without authority, but that would be exceptional. 26
Perhaps if one not an agent for any purpose, but expecting approval
of his action, was soon after given complete charge of the kind of: busi-
ness already conducted, it would be proper for a jury to find his authority
sufficient even if the principal did not know of the events of the past.
The North Carolina case nearest to presenting a possibility of rati-
fication by the subsequent conduct of the very one who first wrongfully
acted seems to be one in which the agent employed to run a business
borrowed without authority and applied the funds so obtained td the
needs of the business.2  But the court correctly held this benefit insuf-
ficient to charge the uninformed principal. If he had been unjustly
enriched there was a remedy not based upon a non-existent affirmation.
Instances of ratification by public and corporate officers are numerous
and for the most part of a routine character.28  In all cases the rule
seems to be, as of course it should be, that the officer or agent affirming
must have, been one who could authorize a like transaction.
When it comes to ratification by the person himself the matter of
disability, already considered in connection with what acts can be rati-
fied, is again important. The accepted rule is that the "principal" must
at the time he affirms be able to authorize such a transaction. 29 It would
follow that a married woman under common law disabilities would be
incapable of ratifying those contracts which she could not validly ap-
point an agent to execute. If she had been single at the date the pur-
ported agent acted for her, but was married when she sought to ratify,
the problem would be presented free of the question of original inval-
idity; but the local cases have not been so dissociated,30 and the most
that can be said is that there is no reason to doubt our acceptance of
the rule. Putting the two rules together then, the "principal" must have
been competent both at the time of the transaction and at the time of
the approval or affirmation. And, as to an infant, it must be taken that
directors are said to have "ratified" a railroad lease already approved by the
stockholders who had also authorized the directors and officers to act. This is
probably not an agency ratification.
28 See RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §93, comment c.
- Swindell v. Latham, 145 N. C. 144, 58 S. E. 1010 (1907).
28 Public officers: Green v. Commissioners of Cherokee County, 67 N. C. 117
(1872). Corporate officers: Directors, Citizens Lumber Co. v. Elias, 199 N. C.
103, 154 S. E. 54 (1930)-passively; (but not where they are under the control of
the officer whose transaction on the corporation's account is in question, Green
River Mfg. Co. v. Bell, 193 N. C. 367, 137 S. E. 132 (1927)); President, Brimmer
v. Brimmer & Co., 174 N. C. 435, 440, 93 S. E. 984, 986 (1917) ; Turner v. C. C.
Disher Chevrolet Co., 209 N. C. 587, 183 S. E. 742 (1936) ; General Freight Agent,
Porter v. Raleigh & Gaston R. R., 132 N. C. 71, 43 S. E. 547 (1903). This list is
not exhaustive.2 2 HUFFCUTT, THE LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1901) §39.
30 See note 8, supra.
1940]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
he can ratify in that inconclusive fashion which his peculiar style of dis-
ability makes possible, i.e., so as to settle the question of agent's author-
ity but not to deprive him of his established right and power to
-disaffirm.31
A special rule has been recognized as applicable to personal repre-
sentatives of decedents and certain other court officers which sustains
ratification by them of actions done on their official behalf before their
appointment. Something akin to the retroactive feature of ratification
itself is applied to justify ratification in these cases, i.e., that the official
appointment dates back.3 2  A case of this kind is Citizens Bank v.
Grove,33 where the agent whose authority had terminated on the death
of Grove, Senior, made a note on February 6 and the executors were
appointed February 7. No point is made of the order of these events
in the opinion, wherein the case is treated as the standard rather than
an extraordinary situation as concerns ratification.
The definition of Ratification quoted in the opening sentence of this
article must once more be scrutinized-this time in connection with the
vexed question of whether an undisclosed principal can ratify.3 4 The
definition speaks of affirming an act "which was done or professedly
done on his account". 35 The first of these alternatives might be thought
to include the case of a wholly undisclosed "principal", i.e., one whose
existence was not disclosed; but a later section and its comment" indi-
cate that the intended rule goes only so far as to recognize ratification
by one whose existence was disclosed though not his identity, i.e., where
the volunteer actor really purported to be agent, not one acting on his
own account.
Language in local cases, taken alone, might indicate a narrower rule
than that of the Restatement. In a case where it was sought to hold a
widow on a contract made by her husband before his death, and claimed
to have been ratified by her, the court observed, "there can be no rati-
fication where the act is done by a person not professedly acting as the
" The parenthetical aside in Flowe v. Hartwick, 167 N. C. 448, 453, 83 S. E.
841, 844 (1914), "(Homer Flowe was under 20 at the time and could not assent)"
must be taken with reservation.
'TIFFANY, AGENcY (2d ed. 1924) 138; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §84,
comment c. Analytically this too should be placed in the topic, "What Acts Can
Be Ratified?', but the more natural assignment seems to be here.
"202 N. C. 143, 162 S. E. 204 (1932).
"4 As a matter of accurate analysis this problem is more correctly a part of
the topic, "What Acts Can Be Ratified?" than of this one, but it is likely to be
thought of as a question of who can ratify, and that is taken as a controlling
reason here for the choice of classification made.
" RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §82. Cf. Robertson v. Plymouth Lumber Co.,
165 N. C. 4, 80 S. E. 894 (1914).
" Id. §85, comment a, illus. 1. Because of special rules concerning sealed instru-
ments an unidentified principal could not ratify. Indeed, the sealed instrument
rule goes much further. See Codell v. Allen, 99 N. C. 542, 544, 6 S. E. 399, 401
(1888).
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agent of the person sought to be charged as principal".3 7  This might
mean that for ratification to be legally possible the very person now
sought to be charged must have been named as principal, or at least
identified, when the transaction took place. The facts of the case, how-
ever, did not require a rule so specific, for the testimony showed that
the husband had purported to act for himself andl not as agent for his
wife or anyone.38 It would have been sufficient then to have announced
a rule consistent with that of the Restatement by saying that when a
person does not profess to act as agent at all no one can ratify. In a
later case which relies upon this one as its first citation the rule is stated
somewhat differently. "It is well understood that in order to a valid
ratification, when an unauthorized contract has been made for alleged
principal, the agent must have contracted or professed to contract for a
principal and the latter must signify his assent or his intent to ratify,
either by words or by conduct. '39 It would be fair to treat the indefi-
nite phrase "a principal" as meaning even an unidentified person. The
case like the previous one contained no evidence that the person signing
the memorandum purported to be an agent, although here she may have
had an unrevealed intention to represent the other defendants. Accord-
ingly, we have decided nothing contrary to the prevailing view now
adopted by the Restatement. But, unless these cases are in the future
to be treated as decided on the other grounds which were present in
both,40 we have definitely committed ourselves against the minority view
long ago championed by Professor Goddard-that ratification will be
recognized in a case where the person negotiating a deal had a secret
intent to act as agent.
41
" Rawlings v. Neal, 126 N. C. 271, 275, 35 S. E. 597, 599 (1900) ; cf. misleading
statement in Fay v. Doyle, 95 F. (2d) 110, 111 (App. D. C. 1938).
38 Rawlings v. Neal, 126 N. C. 271, 274, 35 S. E. 597, 598 (1900). The case
furthermore, and chiefly, was put on the ground that a married woman's contract
of the sort claimed was void and not capable of ratification.
30 Flowe v. Hartwick, 167 N. C. 448, 453, 83 S. E. 841, 844 (1914) (opinion of
Hoke, J.).
0 See note 38, supra, as to the Rawlings case. In the Flowe case it was held
that the defendant did not ratify. See, however, note 41, infra.
" Goddard, Ratification by an Undisclosed Piincipal (1903) 2 MIcH. L. REV.
25. In Patton v. Brittain, 32 N. C. 8 (1848), the signed memorandum disclosed no
agency and yet ratification was found, but it seems likely that the agency and even
the identity of the principal were known. In Thompson v. Taylor, 110 N. C. 70,
14 S. E. 513 (1892), defendant denied that her husband contracted in her name,
but no point was made of this because her status was sufficient defense. In Parks
v. Security Life & Trust Co., 195 N. C. 453, 142 S. E. 473 (1928), it was disputed
whether one S was acting for himself or for the trust company, and nothing is
recorded as to the disclosure either of the trust company as principal or of the
existence-of some principal. That fact would probably be brought out on retrial
before the instruction on ratification ordered by the supreme court would be given.
Colonial Oil Co. v. Jenkins, 212 N. C. 140, 193 S. E. 33 (1937), was discussed as a
question of ratification, but was finally put on the ground of estoppel. McNeely v.
Walters, 211 N. C. 112, 189 S. E. 114 (1937), on the allegations might be a case
of forgery, in which event the signer does not purport to act as agent for another
13171940]
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MANNER OF RATIFICATION
The simplest and most obvious form of ratification would be by
direct statement to that effect by the one having power to ratify. Rel-
atively few of such cases are found-perhaps because their certainty
avoids litigation-, but in curious contrast to the paucity of instances
where the term is thus correctly used stands the flood of forms in which
the term is heaped inappropriately onto a pile of other terms granting
authority in advance,--"hereby ratifying and confirming all that my
said agent may (in the future) do in the premises". Whether this is
supposed to work some sort of equitable estoppel later on, like an after
acquired property clause in a mortgage, or is just an illustration of the
frequently displayed legal affection for quantity rather than quality in
statement and the corresponding aversion ever to pruning a shoot or
sucker alive or dead from the legal jungle, may only be guessed.42 But,
it may be noted that if a declaration of ratification in sweeping terms
like these were made after the event it might operate as to some un-
known and unsuspected transactions in the face of a rule later to be
considered, which usually requires knowledge of all material facts by
the party affirming or approving.
Where an express declaration of ratification is made, it may never-
theless fail because not done with the proper formalities. The well-nigh
universal doctrine is that ratification must meet the same formal require-
ments as those necessary for original authorization.43 In the case of
sealed instruments the common law requisite of sealed authority to the
agent would carry with it a corresponding requisite of sealed ratification
to the purported agent if in each case the deed were to be held the
deed of the principal. In North Carolina the court has consistently
insisted on the necessity of sealed authority for the execution of sealed
instruments, and even for the completion of deeds executed in partly
blank form by the principal himself.44 A correspondingly strict attitude
would be expected in respect of ratification. 45 Some uncertainty, how-
but purports to be that other. There is a great diversity of opinion on ratification
in such cases. HUFFcUTT, THE LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1901) 58; note (1930) 8
TENN. L. REv. 278. The case was also put on the ground of estoppel which is a
valid ground, forgery or no forgery.
2 See on stich tendencies in another quarter discussed ironically, Drinker, Con-
cerning Modern Corporate Mortgages (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 360.
"' HUFFCUTT, THE LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1901) 55; TIFFANY, AGENCY (2d
ed. 1924) 148; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §93.
"Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Wimbish, 192 N. C. 552, 135 S. E. 452
(1926), and citations, although as there indicated the ineffective deed may have
effectiveness in other fashions. And cases explainable on the ground of estoppel
may have modified the rule as to court bonds. Rollins v. Ebbs, 138 N. C. 140, 50
S. E. 577 (1905).
'"The attitude of the court in Davenport v. Sleight, 19 N. C. 381, 384 (1837),
seems to bear this out: "Nothing that he could say in the absence of it [the bond],
could amount to the adoption of it as his deed .. " But the discussion is not very
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ever, is created by two decisions concerning sealed promissory notes.
In the first of these" a sealed note dated in April and due in November
was completed by one of two joint makers who had no sealed authority
from the other, the defendant Bailey; and was transferred to the payee
for value, apparently at about the time of its date. The evidence for
ratification was that in the following September a representative of the
payee exhibited the note to Bailey who "said he signed the note and it
was all right". Of the effect of this interview the court has this to say:
"It [the note] was then complete. The payee's name was in it then,
and this acknowledgment made it his bond then, if it had not been so
before." How far the result here depended on the fact that the defend-
ant saw the note when he spoke47 can only be surmised; but, regardless
of that question, the decision goes far toward creating parol ratification
of sealed documents since there seems to be nothing in the case upon
which an estoppel could be asserted to arrive at the same result, i.e.,
plaintiff is not shown to have acted in any way in reliance on this
statement.
The other case48 is substantially the same, the chief difference being in
the absence of any evidence that the note was shown to the defendant
at the times, when she acknowledged it to be her obligation orally and
by making payments. The importance of that fact in the previous case,
therefore, dwindles considerably. What is left seems to be, in effect,
ratification by oral statement and by making payments and having them
noted on the paper. This seems to be exactly what wag said in McKee
v. Hicks49 to be insufficient, yet the court here in a brief and, seemingly
directly to the point of ratification (the headnote speaks of ratification, but the
opinion does not), and the court seems to have been thinking of redelivery. Com-
pare McKee v. Hicks, 13 N. C. 379 (1830); Blend v. O'Hagan, 64 N. C. 471
(1870). Similarly, in Kime v. Brooks, 31 N. C. 218 (1848), where the only thing
which could have been thought to show ratification was that "no objection was
afterwards made by her father to what she had done". In Isenhour v. Isenhour,
64 N. C. 640 (1870), the court held that testimony should have been admitted to
show that a note previously signed and sealed had been completed by one without
sealed authority. Not much light is shed on the problem by the remark of Justice
Walker on the state of the evidence in Rollins v. Ebbs, 137 N. C. 355, 359, 49 S. E.
341, 342 (1904), "There is nothing admitted, or found by the jury, which shows
that the defendants have, in any way known to the law of this State, assented to
or ratified the insertion of the penalty in the bond." Persons on either side of the
question would probably try to make' something out of the words, "any way known
to the law of this State". (Case overruled later on ground of estoppel.)
Wester v. Bailey, 118 N. C. 193, 24 S. E. 9 (1896).
The quoted language from Davenport v. Sleight, in note 45, supra, would
give room for arguing that some sort of ratification could take place if the signer
saw the completed note when he approved. If this was before the note was even
delivered or at the time of delivery (see the contention of plaintiff in Isenhour v.
Isenhour, 64 N. C. 640 (1870), cited supra note 45) it would be sufficient to con-
stitute adoption, and no ratification would be needed to sustain it from the moment
of its issue.
'8 Moose v. Crowell, 147 N. C. 551, 61 S. E. 524 (1908).
13 N. C. 379 (1830), "And further, that if the paper was not the deed of the
Defendant at the delivery of it to the Plaintiff, the Defendant, by speaking of it
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hasty opinion treats these facts as distinguishing the instant case from
both the McKee case and one other.50 The truth is that this was not
only a hasty opinion but a hard case. The probabilities are that the
note was either written in the maker's presence or delivered by her or
both, and that the plaintiff would have lost his case if the strict rule had
been enforced because he neglected to prove what at first sight seemed
unnecessary for suit on a promissory note.r'
A possible appraisal of these cases is that although they do not say
so they are dealing with the instruments, executed under seal but with-
out sealed authority, as if they were unsealed instruments, the seal being
ignored because put there without authority and not having been rati-
fied. This approach to the question which, as shortly to be seen, has
been followed extensively in case of real estate transactions, would seem
to justify a holding in both cases that the notes were valid and enforce-
able unsealed obligations and the actual result is accordingly not startling.
But however explainable, excusable, or justifiable they are, here
stand two cases, neither one of them containing the word ratification 52
but establishing what to all intents and purposes is a rule that ratification
of sealed obligations, at least of some sealed obligations, can be made by
parol acknowledgment. It may be that the technical rules of sealed
instruments have outlived their utility and should be discarded,5 3 or that,
at least as to negotiable instruments, some sweeping up should be
done ;54 but the housecleaning should be done either by the legislature
or by the court in such a way as to indicate what is gone and what re-
mains. 55 These -decisions give little clue to future developments.
as his bond, or .paying a part of the sum intended to be secured thereby, did not
give it validity.. . ." Id. at 380. This was the language of the trial judge, but it
had the express approval of- the supreme bench.
"' Kime v. Brooks, 31 N. C. 218 (1848), cited supra note 45, where only passive
acknowledgment was present.
"' Now that sealed promissory notes are negotiable instruments and not non-
negotiable specialties, the lawyer naturally thinks of going to trial on them with
the preparation appropriate to a negotiable instruments case. Examine Tyson v.
Joyner, 139 N. C. 69, 51 S. E. 803 (1905); and NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
§§6(4), 16 (last sentence), 19, 24.
2And not indexed in the North Carolina Digest under Agency (Ratification),
Bills and Notes (Ratification), or Bonds (Ratification), but, as to one case, under
Alteration of Instruments (Ratification or Waiver).
"' As per Breese, J., on the need for sealed authority to execute a bond in a
day when a scrawl will do for a seal, ". . . believing that the purpose of justice
are not all subserved by an adherence to such antiquated rules and unmeaning
technicalities, I dissent ... " Maus v. Worthing, 4 Ill. 26, 27 (1841) (A. Lincoln
for appellee).
"Already the other rule of these cases on the matter of seals, i.e., the con-
clusive presumption of consideration, has been cast aside. Cf. Cowen v. Williams,
197 N. C. 432, 149 S. E. 396 (1929), and Patterson v. Fuller, 203 N. C. 788, 167
S. E. 74 (1933).
" In some states a well-defined exception has been established as to corporate
authorization to its agents in recognition of long established custom and as a
concession to good sense. A vote of the directors will suffice as a substitute for
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In another line of cases we have struck at the harshness of the sealed
instrument rule by indirection, but in a fairly well defined manner; the
one just mentioned as a possible way out for the note cases just crit-
icised. We have held that documents under seal which were executed
or completed by one without sealed authority and which, therefore, are
invalid as deeds, can be given effect as enforceable contracts to do the
thing intended, and that a document thus reduced in rank will still
serve to satisfy the statute of frauds requirements for a writing.56 In
states whose statutes either expressly or by judicial interpretation re-
quire the agent to have written authority to make these instruments, a
problem parallel to that regarding sealed authority immediately arises
on this lower legal level. But our statutes contain no such requirement,
and, accordingly, the common law rule that parol authority is sufficient
for the execution of unsealed writings is recognized. It should follow
that parol ratification will validate unauthorized written obligations, even
those bearing an unauthorized seal.
When once the question of formal sufficiency is out of the way the
question becomes one of essential sufficiency, i.e., whether the particular
conduct of the "principal" which is proved is sufficient to make out
affirmation by him of the prior unauthorized transaction.
Express statements of approval usually give little trouble,57 although
there is likely to be a dispute, and so a jury question, as to what was
said. Often, however, the statements are equivocal and present
also a jury question as to whether or not they signify approval or
confirmation.
5 8
a sealed power. Savings Bank of New Haven v. Davis & Center, 8 Conn. 191(1830); RESTATEmENT, AGENCY (1933) §28(2) b. Our liberality in Bailey v.
Hassell, 184 N. C. 450, 115 S. E. 166 (1922), on the matter of what symbol may
do for the corporate seal may forecast a like rule here. The local corporate practice
seems to be to authorize by vote. Green River Mfg. Co. v. Bell, 193 N. C. 367, 137
S. E. 132 (1927).
10 Blacknall v. Parish, 59 N. C. 70 (1860). There is considerable hocus-pocus
about the signature in the cases of incomplete instruments completed by the agent.
The statutory requirement of a signing by the party to be charged, or his agent, is
met by saying that the signature actually written by the principal becomes, when
the document is later handed over by the agent, legally the signing of his name
by the agent.
57 In Hodges v. Holderby, 49 N. C. 500 (1857), the statement by principal to
agent was, "It is all right", and the question was whether this operated to ratify a
collateral act. In Rowland v. Barnes, 81 N. C. 234 (1879), the statement, "Very
well, go ahead and collect", was deemed to be ratification so as to discharge the
agent notwithstanding other assertions of different import. A similar result was
reached where the statement by letter -was that "it is satisfactory to me", Osborne
v. Durham, 157 N. C. 263, 269, 72 S. E. 849, 851 (1911). A stockholders' vote
on a motion might be an equally clear approval. Cf. Hill v. Atlantic & N. C. R. R.,
143 N. C. 539, 554, 55 S. E. 854, 859 (1906), where the motion was to upset the
lease and was defeated.
" Darden v. Baker, 193 N. C. 386, 388, 137 S. E. 146, 147 (1927), wherein the
owner of notes admitted saying of some unauthorized collections made on her
behalf that the agent "had collected this money for me but did not turn it over to
19401
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That silence may be sufficient to constitute ratification when the cir-
cumstances are such that the well-known reasonably prudent man would
speak seems recognized as an abstract proposition,59 but in the North
Carolina cases silence seems invariably to have gone along with some
conduct tending to show acquiescence.0 0
Instances of other conduct having value as proof of acquiescence,
approval, or affirmance are common in our reports, and, except for those
which involved taking the benefits, to be separately considered, most of
them are noted here in the margin.0 1
me". So, in Acme Mfg. Co. v. McPhail, 181 N. C. 205, 210, 106 S. E. 672, 674(1921), a non-committal letter which might be considered also somewhat evasive
was allowed to go in with other evidence on the question. Porter v. Raleigh &
Gaston R. R., 132 N. C. 71, 74, 43 S. E. 547, 548 (1903) (letter from general
freight agent containing some conditional features) ; Trollinger v. Fleer, 157 N. C.
81, 84, 72 S. E. 795, 796 (1911).
SREsTATEmENT, AGENCY (1933) §94. Rule recognized in Earp v. Richardson,
81 N. C. 5, 7 (1879), but inoperative because of principal's ignorance of facts.
See Watson, Trustee v. Proximity Mfg. Co., 147 N. C. 469, 477, 61 S. E.
273, 276 (1908), where the transaction "was never questioned by the Mills Com-
pany", and also funds were drawn against a credit set up for the company. Trol-
linger v. Fleer, 157 N. C. 81, 72 S. E. 795 (1911), cited supra note 58, would be a
good case of this sort if the jury disbelieved the testimony as to defendant's re-
mark about hiring a sick man. See special rule re appearance of unauthorized
attorney where defendant, in ignorance of material fact, fails to attend court.
University of N. C. v. Lassiter, 83 N. C. 38 (1880). Cf. also as to attorney,
Rogers v. McKenzie, 81 N. C. 164 (1879).
61 Making payments on the disputed indebtedness: Green v. Commissioners, 67
N. C. 117 (1872); Johnston County Say. Bank v. Scroggin Drug Co., 152 N. C.
142, 67 S. E. 253 (1910). In Frank Bros. & Co. v. Lefkowitz, 184 N. C. 273, 114
S. E. 293 (1922), defendant principal had repudiated the unauthorized purchase
from plaintiff but after agent's selling part of goods to another dealer and return-
ing remainder to plaintiff, principal took the money and gave agent a check to be
sent in payment of the part sold. The principal might be found to be merely pro-
viding the agent with a check to remit, as a bank would sell him a draft. Jury
question. Miscellaneous cases:
State v. Privett, 49 N. C. 100 (1856), failure to discharge the wrong-doing
clerk, along with keeping proceeds of the unlawful sale.
Moore v. Rogers, 51 N. C. 297 (1859). In settlement with agent, allowing him
credit for funds which agent had, without authority, given principal's son to aid
him in fleeing from state and from his creditors does not make principal liable for
removing or assisting to remove debtor. Tort approved must have been done for
principal's benefit.
White Sewing Machine Co. v. Hill, 136 N. C. 128, 48 S. E. 575 (1904), sending
copy of plaintiff's business license to defendant retailer does not ratify unauthorized
promise of agent for exclusive territory to the retailer. Apparently plaintiff had
no knowledge of the exclusive territory agreement and this ignorance would be
sufficient to make ratification then ineffective.
Flowe v. Hartwick, 167 N. C. 448, 453, 83 S. E. 841, 844 (1914), signing of
deed pursuant to unauthorized contract not treated as ratification, despite intent
to ratify, because of change of mind and destruction of deed. But, that affirmance
need not be communicated to either the "agent" or third party, see Restatement,
§95. And that it can not be revoked, see later herein. Of course, the signing may
have been regarded as tentative. Case also goes on ground of undisclosed principal.
Acme Mfg. Co. v. McPhail, 181 N. C. 205, 106 S. E. 672 (1921), paying freight
on shipment to defendant in accord with unauthorized oral agreement of plaintiff's
agent when written purchase contract required defendant to pay it. Action now to
recover the payment as an advance made for defendant.
Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Howell, 200 N. C. 637, 158 S. E. 203 (1931),
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One case deserving special notice is Gibbs v. Plymouth Motor Cor-
poration.6 2 The facts appear to be as follows. Plaintiff bought a new
Plymouth automobile for $825 from his local dealer, the salesman guar-
anteeing "satisfaction". Very soon it developed an alarming "shimmy".
Complaints to the dealer resulted in the car being examined by a "fac-
tory man"-evidently an employee of the manufacturer-and work be-
ing -done on it at the dealer's garage and another local shop-whether at
the dealer's or manufacturer's expense is not stated. The difficulty was
never cured, and after two years plaintiff traded the vehicle to a Ford
dealer for $100. The contract between the Plymouth Corporation and
the local 'dealer disclaimed any principal and agent relation between
them, and denied any right of the dealer to create any obligations on
the manufacturer. It contained the "standard warranty" with its nu-
merous hedges and exits. So far as appears this manufacturer-dealer
contract was not shown to plaintiff, and it may be taken to have no
bearing on his rights against either defendant except so far as it estab-
lished that the dealer was not the manufacturer's agent. The action
seems to have been for breach of the dealer's express warranty that the
car would give satisfaction, which probably would mean at least that
the car was not defective and was fit to drive. Looking at the matter
in a non-technical way and forgetting the plaintiff's two-year delay, it
would seem that there ought to be some relief for a buyer against the
manufacturer of a car which was clearly unfit for use, whether the
theory were to be breach of implied warranty or something more nearly
related to tort. Furthermore, rules recently gaining a foothold in Amer-
ican law63 seem likely in their ultimate form to cover cases like this,
although their adoption may open the door to many false claims against
distant manufacturers who are at a disadvantage before local juries.6 4
But plaintiff's case was not made out on the ground of some ben-
eficent all-pervading doctrine such as this. It seems to have been on
ceasing to collect installments of interest when agent started to do so. Mixed with
estoppel, as many cases are. Also evidence of authority. Cf. Colonial Oil Co. v.
Jenkins, 212 N. C. 140, 193 S. E. 33 (1937).
In Lawson v. Bank of Bladenboro, 203 N. C. 368, 166 S. E. 177 (1932), bank
collecting draft for payee unauthorizedly allowed drawee to deduct from amount
of draft accompanying shipment of cotton an amount it claimed drawer owed to
it. Payee accepted the short credit to this account and tried to recover the shortage
from the drawer. Held, ratification so as to relieve agent collecting bank.
Maxwell v. Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., 204 N. C. 309, 168 S. E. 403
(1933), performing contract for a time.
McNeely v. Walters, 211 N. C. 112, 189 S. E. 114 (1937), getting indulgence on
note, probably estoppel case, as stated, because of reliance.
02203 N. C. 351, 166 S. E. 74 (1932).
Leidy, Another New Tort? (1940) 38 MIcH. L. REV. 964.
", The jury here found that the local dealer made and breached no warranty,
'but that the manufacturer did both-which would be proper, of course, if the
warranty was made in the name of the principal and then ratified, but is rather
significant under the facts here. -
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the theory that the dealer was an agent and his express warranties were
either authorized or ratified. Advance authority being out of the way
because no agency was shown, the possibility of ratification became
plaintiff's last hope. In support of that he argued that the sending of
a "factory man" to locate the difficulty and have repair work done
"constituted a ratification".6 5 The court refused to accept this argu-
ment, but its reasons do not aid much in classifying the case as an au-
thority on ratification. One might suppose that under the law as here
determined, the sending of a representative to adjust or repair defects
in goods sold did not constitute conduct from which ratification could
be found.66 In a proper case, however, this might be very persuasive
evidence. Nor is the difficulty here that there was no agency. Ratifica-
tion operates where there is no agency as well as where there is an
unauthorized excess of action by an agent. But here there is no ev-
idence that the dealer or his salesman purported to act as agent for the
Plymouth Corporation and, of course, no evidence that the Corporation
so understood when it sent the representative to New Bern. On that
ground the case is sustainable.
The insurance cases which have already been found to present some
novelty seem likewise to have rules of their own on the matter of what
conduct will constitute affirmation. If mere expressions of approbation
are sufficient to produce ratification of an act, it would seem that such
conduct as keeping an insurance policy which had been taken out with-
out the recipient's authority, or, a fortiori, filing a claim on it in case of
loss, ought to manifest approval and bring about ratification. 7 Prob-
ably that would be the holding if legal enforcement of that policy were
now sought. The only question then would be that already considered
herein, whether any such thing as ratification of an insurance contract
is legally possible after loss. Yet, in a case where a prior policy is
sought to be enforced and it would be invalidated by the existence of
the second policy and the existence of the second policy depends on a
"The "factory man" would probably not be a representative with wide enough
authority to ratify dealer's representations, but the agreement reached back of that.
A division office to which complaints were properly directed might be found to
have such authority, and the knowledge of the "factory man" that such representa-
tions had been made could be imputed to the company. Purchasers can not be
expected to "see that a directors' meeting acts on their complaints however the
companies try to tie the hands of their officers or agent.
"A quotation adopted by the court from Farquhar Co. v. Hardy Hardware
Co., 174 N. C. 369, 93 S. E. 922 (1917), furthers this impression. But the cases
are only superficially similar, for the cited case involved only the manufacturer and
the dealer. The dealer was bound by a specific contract, and the decision turned
chiefly on violation of the parol evidence rule, a thing not here involved.
"' The text statements are usually broad enough to include such conduct. HUFF-
cuRT, THE LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1901) §34(2); TIFFANY, AGENCY (2d ed.
1924) 146; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §93. But cases of making claims on, as
distinguished from expressing approval of or suing on, unauthorized contracts are
hard to find.
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finding of ratification, retention of this policy and filing of a claim on
it were found to be insufficient evidence of ratification; and the finding
was upheld by the supreme court. 68  This holding seems to be a clear
departure from the standard rules to meet a particular situation. The
insured is likely in all such cases to feel that he should first grab at all
prospects and let go the least desirable ones when he can take stock of
the situation. In insurance cases the court saves him from the dog,
bone, and pool of water consequences which would ensue. In other
situations, where he will not lose all by ratification, they clinch his
decision on far less evidence. Suppose, though, that suit had been
brought on the second policy and then discontinued. The bringing of
suit is "one of the most uniquivocal methods of showing ratification
of an agent's act".0 9 If we recognize the possibility of ratification after
loss, as it now seems we do,70 there would seem to be no way to avoid
a finding of ratification of the second policy and simultaneous invalida-
tion of the first one. The ratifying insured would have had full knowl-
edge of the material facts though he might be ignorant of the legal
effects of his action. Indeed, in North Carolina, he could not be
otherwise.
BRINGING SUIT
As just observed, bringing suit on an unauthorized contract is very
emphatic evidence of affirmation. That course of action is in the class
with taking the benefits, next to be discussed-it is trying to get the
benefits. 71 But it is the rule that other suits and defenses not on the
contract may equally be in recognition of the validity of the originally
unauthorized transaction.
The Restatenwnt limits the rule to suits in which either the third
party or the purported agent is an adverse party.7 2 Perhaps the rule
should be of wider application, for to bring trover against someone to
whom the agent had wrongfully delivered goods which he had there-
tofore unauthorizedly bought in the plaintiff's name from a third party
would seem to be in recognition and confirmation of the unauthorized
purchase as much as a suit against the agent would be.73  The cases
s Nelson v. Atlanta Home Ins. Co., 120 N. C. 302, 27 S. E. 38 (1897) ; see note
(1939) 121 A. L. R. 1428.
1 'MECHEM, LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §446.
0 Belk's Dep't Store v. George Washington Fire Ins. Co., 208 N. C. 267, 180
S. E. 63 (1935), already discussed.
1 1 MECHEM, LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §446.1 2 RESTATEMENT AGENCY (1933) §97.
The rule in Mechem, therefore, while more vague, sufficiently gives the under-
lying idea and is more adaptable. The supposed case of suit against a converter
could, of course, be brought under the general conduct section (§93) of the Re-
statement although this section seems to make the conduct only evidence of af-
firmance while suit within §97 seems to constitute affirmance. Quaere, should the
instruction in one case be binding, and in the other discretionary?
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are ordinarily clear enough. The problem sometimes, however, is
whether the lawsuit in question is of a kind to fall within the spirit or
letter of the rule in any of its forms of statement. One North Carolina
case, decided as if within the rule, presents rather unusual facts.
7 4
Plaintiff in Georgia sold cotton to one Branch. Branch resold to
Bladenboro Mills in North Carolina to whom he was indebted. The
cotton was shipped direct, from plaintiff to the mills. If the mills had
remitted to their seller, Branch, it is evident that they could have prop-
erly deducted his debt to them. That is what they did in effect, but the
deal was handled by means of a bill of lading with draft attached and
so involved other parties and complications. The draft was drawn by
Branch, payable not to his own order but to the order of plaintiff-
perhaps to assure plaintiff getting his money from Branch before he
surrendered his cotton, perhaps just to prevent the mills from taking
out Branch's debt before paying. Apparently plaintiff sent the draft
through his Georgia bank to the Bladenboro Bank (defendant) for col-
lection,75 and 'defendant unauthorizedly76 allowed the mills to deduct
the Branch debt, thus surrendering the draft and bill of lading for less
than was drawn. Defendant then remitted the short sum to plaintiff's
bank with a statement of what had been done. Plaintiff, being advised,
permitted the remittance to be credited to his account and "attempted
to collect" the amount short from Branch. Failing in this, plaintiff
sues the collecting bank for its default in taking less than it was charged
with collecting for him. The court below found the facts and held the
defendant not liable, apparently on the ground that by accepting and
keeping the short credit while he tried his luck collecting from Branch
,the plaintiff had ratified the short collection. That is a sufficient reason,
although one having nothing to 'do with ratification by bringing suit.
It was on appeal that this idea seems first to have come into the case.
Assuming that the bank would have been liable to plaintiff for failure
to collect in full,77 the court affirmed the judgment below not only on
the ground that plaintiff ratified by keeping the money collected by his
agent but that the bringing of the present suit "was an unequivocal
ratification".
' Lawson v. Bank of Bladenboro, 203 N. C. 368, 166 S. E. 177 (1932).
Which, under the "Massachusetts rule" recognized here and under the stipula-
tion on most deposit slips, makes the collecting bank agent not of the forwarding
bank but of the depositor.
"' Unauthorizedly because the bank was hired to collect the whole amount. If
the principal was not entitled to that much (as he would not be if he had parted
with his title to the cotton and was merely collecting what Branch had coming
from the mills), that would protect the bank in a later suit by the principal for its
breach of duty, i.e., there would be a breach of duty by A but no damages to P.
If -plaihtiff had retained the cotton for security, and all parties were on notice of
that fact, he would have a right to damages from the bank for surrendering the
draft and bill for less than the face amount drawn.
" On this question, however, see note 76, supra.
(Vol. 18
RATIFICATION IN NORTH CAROLINA
The case seems to be correctly decided on the first ground, but not
on the second. This suit did not recognize and affirm the binding char-
acter of the agent's act, which was accepting too little,78 but rather
sought to enforce the agent's original authority and duty, which was to
obtain the right amount. Before this suit was brought the plaintiff had
affirmed the unsatisfactory work of its agent by taking and keeping the
benefit of that work.79
ACCEPTANCB Op BENEFITS
By far the most numerous group of cases on ratification in North
Carolina is that in which the case just discussed is found properly to
fall, i.e., that group wherein acceptance or retention of the benefits with
knowledge of the material facts is the basis of the ratification. Aside
from the very obvious or merely cumulative ones summarized or cited
in the footnotes 0 there are some of special significance. The very first
7 Nor, in the language of the Restatement (§97) was it a suit "to enforce
promises which were part of the unauthorized transaction or to secure interests
which were the fruit of such transaction and to which he would be entitled only
if the act had been authorized".7' That was the basis of the decision in Southwest Nat. Bank v. Justice, 157
N. C. 373, 72 S. E. 1016 (1911), relied on here, the facts of which were gomewhat
similar but simpler, i.e., collection and return of less than the face amount with
notice that it was tendered as full payment. Plaintiffs keeping this payment ratified
the agent's act in receiving it, and could not succeed in suit against the debtor for
the balance. They should have returned the unsatisfactory remittance as a condi-
tion to suing on the original claim.
" Receiving and keeping goods with knowledge that they were bought by A
unauthorizedly on P's credit. Patton v. Brittain, 32 N. C. 8 (1848) ; Brittain v.
Westhall, 135 N. C. 492, 47 S. E. 616 (1904). Corporation's receipt and use of
goods bought by stockholder and shown by invoice to have been charged to it binds
it for purchase price. Ratification and estoppel. L. & E. Miller v. Land & Lumber
Co. of N. C., 66 N. C. 504 (1872). Likewise, when purchase was by president of
family corporation and corporate note given. Phillips v. Interstate Land Co., 176
N. C. 514, 97 S. E. 417 (1918). Receipt by president at head office of maps, re-
ports, etc. from one hired by a local agent as civil engineer implies ratification of
the contract of employment. Lewis v. Albemarle & Raleigh R. R., 95 N. C. 179,
187 (1886). Accepting deed to strip of land for right of way obtained by mere
volunteer and using the land binds grantee to terms of purchase. Johnson v. East
Carolina Land & Ry. Co., 116 N. C. 927, 21 S. E. 28 (1895). Using machinery ob-
tained pursuant to contract made through common officer of two corporations.
Highland Cotton Mills v. Ragan Knitting Co., 194 N. C. 80, 138 S. E. 428 (1927).
Use of goods, Payne-Farris Co. v. Kuester, 212 N. C. 545, 193 S. E. 707 (1937).
Keeping money from A's unlawful sale of spirits to a slave, jury apparently be-
lieving P had knowledge. Question is as to burden on that issue. State v. Privett,
49 N. C. 100 (1856). Receipt of cartage charge for T's goods, hauled to market
by A in P's wagon without authority, ratifies carriage contract, but does not make
P liable for proceeds of the goods sold for T by A. Hodges v. Holderby, 49 N. C.
500 (1857). Receipt and payment for part of logs bought by alleged unauthorized
agent operates to ratify whole contract. Williams v. Crosby Lumber Co., 118 N. C.
928, 24 S. E. 800 (1896) (though dissent finds nothing in record about payment.,
Id. at 939, 24 S. E. at 803). Receipt of money from sale, but disclaiming intent
thereby to ratify under erroneous advice that it would not constitute ratification.
Norwood v. Lassiter, 132 N. C. 52, 43 S. E. 509 (1903). See RESTATEmENt,
AGENCY (1933) §98 (last sentence). Agent got plaintiff to pay for a large number
of subscriptions to newspaper holding a contest on assurances she would thereby
get first prize. Public policy argument dismissed. Waggoner v. Western Carolina
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case on the subject in this state is one of these.81 Here one Pritchard
borrowed the mare of the defendant and on the suggestion of one Saun-
ders who knew the defendant wanted to trade, but without any sem-
blance of authority, exchanged the mare with a warranty of soundness
for a horse of the plaintiff. Pritchard then took the newly acquired
horse to the defendant and told him of the trade but not of the war-
ranty. In this state of information the defendant approved the deal
and took the horse. Being later sued for breach of the unknown and
unauthorized warranty, he was held liable. The court was of the opin-
ion that if authority to sell had been given in advance, the defendant
might have limited it and expressly excluded any liability for warranty,
but that if he had "been silent ... and trusted that to Pritchard's dis-
cretion" he should have been bound. This amounts to implied author-
ity to warrant soundness when that is not expressly forbidden.82
Reasoning from that premise, the court then concludes that the de-
fendant who takes the fruits of the deal obtained by the giving of a
warranty is liable on it. To have avoided liability "he should have
enquired" before he accepted the fruits. This last remark seems to
suggest that one may be bound by an affirmation made in ignorance
of material facts if only he could have learned them by due diligence,
which is not the way the rule is usually stated. 83 On this more will be
said later.
But if the position of the court on that point be thought question-
able there is another way the case might be explained. Suppose the
defendant had received the horse in ignorance but the next day had
been fully informed. His informed retention of the horse would op-
erate to ratify where his ignorant receipt did not. We have so held,
even when information reaches the principal as late as in the trial of a
lawsuit based on the transaction.8 4
There are situations, however, where the knowledge comes too late.
If the principal has so far used the things received as to make it unfair
to require that he return them, failure so to do after knowledge will not
bind him on the unauthorized transaction. This is merely one part of
a broader doctrine making ratification inoperative after a significant
Publishing Co., 190 N. C. 829, 130 S. E. 609 (1925). Sugg v. North Carolina
Agric. Credit Corp., 196 N. C. 97, 144 S. E. 554 (1928), drawing against deposit as
ratification of bank's endorsement of plaintiff's paper and credit to his account.
Citizens Bank v. Grove, 202 N. C. 143, 162 S. E. 204 (1932); Jones v. Bank of
'Chapel Hill, 214 N. C. 794, 1 S. E. (2d) 135 (1939) ; National Surety Co. of N. Y.
v. Jackson County Bank, 20 F. (2d), 644 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927).81Lane v. Dudley, 6 N. C. 119 (1812).
See, however, 1 MECHEm, LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §886.
1 MECHEM, LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §403. Cf., however, RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY (1933) §91, comment e.
8 Southwest Nat. Bank v. Justice, 157 N. C. 373, 375, 72 S. E. 1016 (1911),
"but he knows it now and insists on retaining the money".
(Vol. 18
RATIFICATION IN NORTH CAROLINA
change in the principal's position. The Restatement gives as one illus-
tration the case of P's workmen installing in P's house some window
frames purchased by A without authority and delivered on the job.85
Our own cases contain perhaps a more valuable illustration. In Parker
v. Brown"0 a contractor who 'had agreed to remodel defendant's house
at a certain price, materials included, nevertheless bought lumber from
plaintiffs in defendant's name and used it in the work. The court spent
most of its time on the matter of implied or apparent authority and
disposed of the argument about ratification rather summarily. The
court said, ". . . the single fact that the lumber was used in repairing
the house for -defendant would not be any evidence of a ratification of
such representations as Spencer may have made to plaintiffs." The
principal here, as the evidence shows, had settled with the contractor.8 7
Another type of case in which receipt of the benefits of the agent's
act does not operate as ratification is that in which the principal is
entitled in his own right and independently of the agent's act to the
very thing received, usually money.88 It was on that ground, among
others, that Wynn v. Grant 9 was decided. It appeared there that plain-
tiff owned two notes secured by a deed of trust on a house and lot in
Asheville. The maker of the notes sold the house and the buyers paid
to the trustee the full sum owed to plaintiff under the deed of trust and
the amount due the sellers for their equity. The trustee entered a
release in the register and sent to plaintiff the principal and interest on
one of the notes due a month later and the interest only on the other
one which still had a year to run. As to the latter he inquired if the
plaintiff would discount it, and was advised in the negative. The trustee
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §99, illus. 5.
8' 131 N. C. 264, 265, 42 S. E. 605, 606 (1902).
8 See also remark about principal's being "prejudiced", in Brittain v. Westhall,
135 N. C. 492, 496, 47 S. E. 616, 617 (1904). The instruction approved in the
same case on second appeal-137 N. C. 30, 33, 49 S. E. 54, 55 (1904)-seems to
overlook the possibility of ratification by retention after notice of a purchase on
his credit.
88 The rule is variously stated, 1 MECHEM, LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §437;
TIFFANY, AGENCY (2d ed. 1924) §96; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §98 and
comment c. And the exact extent of its application is not very clearly indi-
cated. Wilkins-Ricks Co. v. Welch, 179 N. C. 266, 102 S. E. 316 (1920), might
be thought to be such a case, and, if so, then wrongly decided. Here the mortgagor
(not an agent but, in selling mortgaged property and trying to pass mortgagee's
interest, standing in a somewhat analogous position) sold mortgaged mules for
money and other mules. The mortgagee took the cash as a payment, but refused
to take the mules as substitute security, and did nothing to recover the others from
the buyers. Held, ratification and no enforceable lien on original animals. It might
be argued that plaintiffs got only what they were entitled to, i.e., a payment on
their loan, but their knowledge of mortgagor's promise to get the mules released,
and subsequent conduct created equities on which to base an estoppel even if ratifica-
tion were doubtful.
0 166 N. C. 39, 53. 81 S. E. 949, 955 (1914). Also, Bank of Franklin v. Trotter,
207 N. C. 442, 177 S. E. 325 (1934). Cf. Arbogast v. Corporation Comm., 200
N. C. 793, 158 S. E. 559 (1931) (where bank had a right to foreclose).
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soon died insolvent, and in plaintiff's action to recover, the principal
now having fallen due on the second note, he is met by the contention
inter alia that he ratified the act of the trustee in receiving the prepay-
ment of the whole debt by accepting the payment of the first note. On
this the court held that there was no ratification because the plaintiff
had no knowledge of the material facts when he received the remit-
tance, and that before he did acquire such knowledge two things had
happened: first, the agent had become insolvent, and second, the note
whose payment he had received had matured and he was then entitled
to that money anyway.
The first of these factors is withi. the rule already discussed con-
cerning change of principal's situation, and would probably be sufficient
ground for the decision. The second factor is the one now under dis-
cussion. If, to use a tax term, the transaction is regarded as "unitary",
because it was one single payment to the agent, it is clear that the prin-
cipal -did not know the facts when he received only part of the money.
And the court seems right in saying that after maturity of the first
note he was legally entitled to the money without depending on the
agent's act. Whether the rule envisioned a case like this may be
doubted, but its language seems to fit and perhaps its equitable purpose
is accomplished. If, on the other hatid, the transaction is regarded as
two payments made at the same time, the plaintiff took the first with
full knowledge about it, i.e., that it had been prepaid to an unauthorized
agent. He would thus have ratified prepayment of note number one. 0
But he neither knew about note number two nor received any benefits
other than the payment of interest and so would not have ratified the
second principal collection either then or later when he learned
about it.91
Other cases in which, for some reason or other, the receipt of ben-
efits was found or held not to bring about ratification are noted in the
margin.92
" And probably would have given ground for arguing estoppel as to the second
payment if it had been separately paid to the agent later on.
. Refer also to Hooper v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 190 N. C. 423, 130
S. E. 49 (1925), where plaintiff, having been sued on a note he owed the bank, left
his brother to pay and take it up, and the brother without authority paid an at-
torney's fee which plaintiff now sues to recover. The defense argument is that
plaintiff after knowledge had ratified (presumably -by recognizing the remaining
features of the settlement and perhaps by not offering to return the note and rein-
state the case). In a way this looks like the converse of Southwest Nat. Bank v.
Justice, 157 N. C. 373, 72 S. E. 1016 (1911), cited supra note 79, but the court held
the transaction severable so that assent to the other payments would not evidence
affirmation of this.
2 Where agent sold principal's library for depreciated bonds, if principal re-
ceived and kept the bonds that would amount to ratification, but principal is en-
titled to an instruction that if he could not return the bonds or make known his
repudiation because of disrupted communications, he had not ratified. Born v.
[Vol. 18
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Throughout the cases on ratification by taking benefits runs the
statement in one form or another that the burdens must be taken with
the benefits, a narrower manner of putting the also common thought
that the whole contract must be affirmed if any of it is. No effort will
be made to examine or even list all of the cases in which this doctrine
finds expression, but some are given merely to provide reference. 93
The limitations on the application of the rule have already been discussed.
Throughout the cases there is also the constant recognition and
reiteration of the elemental proposition, already often alluded to herein
in connection with specific cases, that there must be knowledge of the
material facts for ratification to arise from assent.94 Only a few of the
fringe cases will be specially examined. As has already been noted, it is
knowledge and not notice or opportunity for knowledge which is meant
by the rule,9 5 though occasionally the word "notice" is used in the
cases 90 and occasionally a decision seems to depart from the accepted
rule and deal with the problem actually on the basis of notice or what
reasonable diligence would have discovered. 97 Attention has already
been given to Lane v. Dudley,98 wherein the court held the defendant
liable on a warranty made by one who sold his mare without authority.
The case can be explained on the ground that although the defendant
did not know of the warranty when he received the horse broight him
Smith, 67 N. C. 245 (1872) (seems as if efforts should have been continued till
successful).
Receipt and use of money loaned on corporate mortgage improperly signed and
not authorized by directors or stockholders, held, not a sufficient ratification, at
least so as to make its registry good against creditors. Duke v. Markham. 105
N. C. 131, 10 S. E. 1017 (1890).
Receipt of payments made as consideration for unauthorized release of land
from mortgage cannot operate to ratify a purported release which was not for-
mally sufficient to be either a release or a memorandum of a contract to release.
Woodcock v. Merrimon, 122 N. C. 731, 30 S. E. 321 (1898) (cf. dissent and
arguments on estoppel).
"Rudasill v. Falls, 92 N. C. 222 (1885) (even when there were two docu-
ments) ; Christian v. Yarborough, 124 N. C. 72, 32 S. E. 383 (1899); Corbett
v. Clute, 137 N. C. 546, 50 S. E. 216 (1905)' (taking whole here means taking
nothing since the burden invalidates the mortgage) ; Alex Sprunt & Sons v. May,
156 N. C. 388, 72 S. E. 821 (1911) ; Journal Publishing Co. v. Barber, 165 N. C.
478, 81 S. E. 694 (1914); Morris v. Basnight, 179 N. C. 298, 102 S. E. 389
(1920) ; Maxwell v. Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., 204 N. C. 309, 168 S. E.
403 (1933).
"I MEcHEm, LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §393; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
(1933) §91. Earp v. Richardson, 81 N. C. 5 (1879); Johnson v. Royster, 88
N. C. 194 (1883) (perhaps dictum); Sherrill & Co. v. Weisiger Clothing Co.,
114 N. C. 438, 19 S. E. 365 (1894); Wise & Bro. v. Texas Co., 166 N. C. 610,
82 S. E. 974 (1914).
" 1 MECHEM, LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §403; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
(1933) §91, comment c.
"' See the instruction asked and approved in Brittain v. Westall, 137 N. C. 30,
33, 49 S. E. 54, 55 (1904), and the remarks of the court in connection.
" See University of N. C. v. Lassiter, 83 N. C. 38, 42 (1880),--apparently
there is a special rule as to attorney and client.0S6 N. C. 119 (1812).
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in exchange he had since learned of it and retained the horse. But
that reason was not given, and the opinion may mean that if prior
authority to do one thing would have included implied authority
to do another, then affirmance in ignorance of the latter having
been -done is binding. Thus if authority to sell and deliver implied
authority to collect, an affirmance with knowledge only of the sale
would be binding as to collections. It would be otherwise of course as
to an act not implied, e.g., authority to sell and deliver coal would not
include authority to deliver negligently and break a window; therefore,
ignorance of the negligent act would preclude ratification. This is not
an impossible rule, though I find no authority for it. The rule that
affirmance binds when there is or ought to be knowledge goes further,
of course, since reasonable diligence might in some cases turn up the
acts beyond those implied as well as those within.
In the latter category are the observations of Justice Walker in
Hall v. Giessell,90 where an employer was held liable for goods pur-
chased by its employees under an alleged unauthorized arrangement by
its superintendent. The charges had been paid for a number of months
so there would be ample basis for an estoppel, but on trial Judge Bryson
had given instructions on ratification; and the opinion above has this
to say on knowledge by the defendant: "If the defendants were at all
watchful of their interests and diligent in the prosecution and manage-
ment of their business, they would have ascertained why McGee was
making these monthly payments, . . .100 Taken alone, this sounds like
a "constructive knowledge" doctrine, but what follows shows that the
judge was speaking of evidence from which a jury might find actual
knowledge, which is quite a different thing.101 And in Morris v. Bas-
night,10 2 where Justice Hoke speaks of the defendant's accepting and
holding the benefits of the agent's trade but omits any reference to
knowledge, the finding below that certain conveyances were made in bad
faith clearly takes care of that element since there could have been no
bad faith without knowledge or suspicion of plaintiff's claim.10 3
But, in Fisher v. Roper Lumber Company,10 4 where an injured
employee claimed that he had 'been hired for life at a "living wage" by
defendant's foreman and the question was one of ratification, Justice
:1 179 N. C. 657, 103 S. E. 392 (1920).00 Id. at 659, 103 S. E. at 393.
10 1 MEcHEM, LAW OF AENCY (2d ed. 1914) §406.102179 N. C. 298, 102 S. E. 389 (1920).
' "Which raises the question whether suspicion would take the place of knowl-
edge. I find no local "counterpart of the "Can't-shut-his-eyes" doctrine stated in
Mechent (§404) and Tiffany (pp. 143-144, notes 60, 61) nor of the "willing-to-
affirm-regardless" rule stated in all the texts, though some of the North Carolina
cases might have been put on that ground.
10183 N. C. 485, 111 S. E. 857 (1922).
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Hoke said, "they knew, or should have known, the condition of his
return and the agreement concerning his employment, assuredly they
had every opportunity to know, and there were facts sufficient to excite
inquiry as to the terms of his further employment."10 5 These assertions
go far toward committing us to the doctrine that occasion to know will
take the place of knowledge in ratification; but even here the court was
passing on a jury verdict and had in mind only that the facts alluded
to were sufficient to sustain the finding on which the judgment was
based. Until the distinction is argued to the court it is by no means
clear that we are outside the beaten path.
Closely akin to charging the principal with what he should know
is the device of raising implications of knowledge from particular facts.
An instance of this is the remark of Justice Merrimon in a case involv-
ing the validity of a contract employing plaintiff as an engineer in the
planning and construction of a railway line in eastern North Carolina.10 6
Speaking of the receipt by the president and directors of survey maps
and charts from him and the payment of checks issued to him by the
local vice-president, the learned judge said: "Such acts would imply
notice of such employment and its nature, and a ratification of it.' 0 7
That takes in a good deal of territory. Ordinarily no presumption of
knowledge of the material facts should arise from mere receipt of ben-
efits.10 8 Little would be left of the knowledge rule after that trick.
But some facts would be learned from the receipt of papers obviously
prepared by an engineer. And here the coming through of regular
checks would be some evidence of a fixed salary arrangement as ilis-
tinguished from a piecework hiring such as could be assumed from
the mere receipt of drawings. A jury would be warranted on this show-
ing in finding actual knowledge of the material facts, and that was what
was done. If anything is left to criticise it is the word "imply".
The real weed in the garden seems to have come up in the famous
Buchu Tonic case, 10 9 wherein the defendant tried to recover on the
promise of plaintiff's salesman that plaintiff would pay any license tax
levied on the buyer on his sales of the tonic. On the theory that the
knowledge of the agent is the knowledge of the principal, Chief justice
...Id. at 490, 111 S. E. at 859.
1. Lewis v. Albemarle & Raleigh R. R., 95 N. C. 179 (1886).
'Id. at 187.
108 Shipment of goods as per contract does not show knowledge. Wise & Bro.
v. Texas Co., 166 N. C. 610, 622, 82 S. E. 974, 978 (1914). Knowledge by a
corporation will be presumed from slight circumstances when it has had the bene-
fit of the contract. Quoted along with many other doctrines in Morris v. The
Y. &.B. Corp., 198 N. C. 705, 716, 153 S. E. 327, 333 (1930).
... Haynor Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 147 N. C. 267, 61 S. E. 54 (1908). The case
does not speak of ratification, but seems obviously to involve it notwithstanding
the very large authority to warrant which the learned chief justice recognized
at the outset. On that, compare 1 MECHEM, LAW OF AGENcY (2d ed. 1914) §889.
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Clark held the manufacturer responsible on the "warranty". But the
knowledge of the wrongdoing agent is not the knowledge of the prin-
cipal"--if it were there would be no sense in the rule requiring knowl-
edge-and, so far as the case turns on ratification of express warranty
-as distinguished from liability for false representations, it seems
unsupportable.
One more special angle of the problem needs comment. It is gen-
erally held that the knowledge with which we are here concerned is
knowledge of material facts and not of legal consequences."1 It is
sometimes said that unless the principal knows that he is not bound on
his agent's contract he is still ignorant of a material fact. In a North
Carolina case" 2 an agent ordered not to sell thereafter at a certain price
dated back an order wrongfully so as to give the buyer the old price.
The principal did not know that fact and so supposed himself bound.
The court stated the rule in the broad form given above, but the case
obviously does not require us to go that far, for here the principal's
lack of information was purely on the fact of the dating back. Ig-
norance of whether he is bound as a matter of law, as, e.g., whether the
agent will be found to have had apparent authority, is quite a different
proposition.
EFFECTS OF RATIFICATION
These have been indicated in part as other problems were being
considered. The underlying doctrine is that with which this paper
opened because it was annexed to the definition of the subject, i.e., that
ratification operates as prior authority. In general that answers most
questions, and the cases become fairly obvious applications of its lan-
guage. Thus in contract cases, when effective, it binds P and T to each
other" 13 on the contract as made by A, binds P to A for commissions, 14
and relieves A of responsibility to P and to T.1 5
"I Hur~cuTT, THE LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1901) 51; 1 MECHEM, LAW OF
AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §407; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §91, comment c.
Mechem doubtfully, and Huffcutt apparently approvingly, recognize some holdings
that the agent is presumed to tell because it is his duty to do so. But is that a
likely thing when the agent is acting beyond his authority?
.. 1 MECHEM, LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §395; cf. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
(1933) §91, comment d.
... Wise & Bro. v. Texas Co., 166 N. C. 610, 619, 82 S. E. 974, 977 (1914).
... v. T: Belk's Dep'± Store v. George Washington Fire Ins. Co., 203 N. C.
267, 180 S. E. 63 (1935). T v. P: Lane v. Dudley, 6 N. C. 119 (1812) ; also most
of the latter cases. (The letters here, P, A, and T, refer to principal, agent, and
third party respectively.)
114 Western Carolina Realty Co. v. Rumbough, 172 N. C. 741, 90 S. E. 931
(1916); rule recognized in Starkweather & Shepley v. Gravely, 187 N. C. 526,
122 S. E. 297 (1924), though ratification not found.
.1. Osborne v. Durham, 157 N. C. 263, 72 S. E. 849 (1911). Defendants sold
plaintiff's stock at his request, but could not get cash and so took paper of which
he was advised. He assented. When paper became uncollectible because of in-
solvency of makers, plaintiff sued the agents. Held, relieved.
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Ratification is said not to be revocable, 116 and the local cases bear
that out.1
1 7
As to the more troublesome problems, our cases seem to present
examples of but two, both of which have been partly considered already.
The first is the matter of intervening equities. There is a considerable
body of law on this problem elsewhere, but the case here most directly
presenting the problem involved a corporate mortgage faultily executed
as to form and improperly authorized, but nevertheless registered. 18
Because of the formal defect, the attempted ratification was probably
ineffective anyway, but the court added that ratification could not op-
erate so as to validate the original registry as against creditors. The
usual rule blocks ratification only as against intervening equities. Noth-
ing was said as to what class of creditors was meant in North Carolina,
and presumably the decision would protect only those creditors who
could upset an unregistered mortgage.
The other problem is that of collateral matters and independent
rights not affected by ratification. In the section above on Manner of
Ratification two cases of severable transactions were examined. But
perhaps the best case in the local reports on a collateral transaction is
Hodges v. Holderby." 9 There, a clerk in a store, being directed by his
principal, the defendant, to buy a load of iron and take it in the prin-
cipal's wagon from Watauga County to Rockingham County and return
with goods for the store, found it impossible to get the iron and so,
without authority, agreed to take plaintiff's bacon along and sell it.
This he did and on return reported to defendant, his principal, who
approved. Plaintiff later paid defendant the charge for cartage and for
the clerk's time in making the sale,' 20 but, on failing to get his bacon
In Rowland v. Barnes, 81 N. C. 234 (1879), defendant without authority sold
plaintiff's gin to T. Plaintiff ratified. Agent was relieved.
Lawson v. Bank of Bladenboro, 203 N. C. 368, 166 S. E. 177 (1932). De-
fendant having a draft to collect for plaintiff, accepted less than amount due.
Plaintiff ratified. Bank was relieved. Cf. Leigh v. Western Union Tel. Co., 190
N. C. 700, 130 S. E. 728 (1925).
"'0 1 MECHEM, LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §489.
... Rowland v. Barnes, 81 N. C. 234 (1879), where after professing assent to
A's sale to T, he later made remarks indicating an intent to hold A. Ineffective.
See Norwood v. Lassiter, 132 N. C. 52, 56, 43 S. E. 509, 510 (1903). The re-
verse of that process, ratification after repudiation, seems to be recognized in
Frank Bros. & Co. v. Lefkowitz, 184 N. C. 273, 114 S. E. 293 (1922), where,
after rejecting a purchase on his account, the principal did acts which the jury
may find constituted ratification so as to bind him. This is in accord with the rule
as stated in Mechem (§489). In another case where acts relied on for ratifica-
tion were not communicated, ratification was held not to be complete. The acts
were treated as evidence only of an unexecuted "intent to ratify". This may in
effect have amounted to revocation, but that view was not stated. The case went
off on another point. Flowe v. Hartwick, 167 N. C. 448, 83 S. E. 841 (1914).
118 Duke v. Markham, 105 N. C. 131, 10 S. E. 1017 (1890).
1149 N. C. 500 (1857).
1 0 The statement of facts recites that "the price for hauling the bacon, was
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money from the clerk, sued the principal. The case depended entirely
on ratification as there was no evidence of prior authority or even ap-
parent authority, and there was no question but what defendant had
assented to the clerk's act. But the assent was held not to charge the
defendant with the sum collected by the clerk; neither did the receipt
of payment for the clerk's services, "because he was entitled to it
whether McGuire had collected the money or not". This statement of
the court has a verbal resemblance to the rule about the principal's in-
dependent rights ;121 it can not be classed with the cases under that rule
since the principal's rights in such cases exist independent of the un-
authorized transaction, which here they certainly did not. The real
reason here, as the court elsewhere recognized in its opinion, was that
the clerk was the plaintiff's agent in making the sale and the defendant
only received payment for allowing the plaintiff to have the use of the
clerk's time.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
This examination of the North Carolina cases on ratification dis-
doses no need for any radical changes in theory or approach to meet
the changing times. In general, the idea that one can become by assent
a party to engagements or transactions made by a person professing to
act as agent seems to produce reasonably satisfactory results. There are,
of course, cases which permit a jury verdict to carry the obligations of
ratification pretty far. The case in which a company was saddled with
the obligation to employ an injured worker for life at a "living wage"
for himself and his probably increasing family is one. 122 As already
noted, the affirmance there was found chiefly in the fact of paying the
worker his old wage for a period after the agent had made the un-
authorized promise. The effect of a series of cases like that one on
Mrs. Sanger's work might be worth considering as a part of the social
background of the law. But the angle of the law of ratification in agency
which is shown to warrant further study and criticism with the likeli-
hood of really profitable disclosures and the opportunity for suggestions
of value is the matter of trial practice and procedure. In many of the
cases discussed herein no issue was submitted on ratification. Of course,
a mere question whether defendant "principal" did or did not enter
into a transaction with the plaintiff would be sufficient as an issue if
the jury had the benefit of specific and lucid instructions on how the
paid by the plaintiff to the defendant". The opinion, however, speaks of payment
being made "for the use of the wagon, and the time and labor of his clerk, in
selling the bacon". If defendant charged plaintiff only for the cartage, the case
would be even clearer.
121 See text accompanying notes 88-91, supra.
22 Fisher v. Roper Lumber Co., 183 N. C. 485, 111 S. E. 857 (1922), cited
supra note 104; cf. Stevens v. Cecil, 209 N. C. 738, 184 S. E. 531 (1936).
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contract might have become binding on the "principal" with a particular
reference to the rules of ratification. Considering the conglomerate
treatment of implied and apparent authority and ratification found in
the opinions of the supreme court, it may be expected that the treatment
of the matter at trial may sometimes not be such as to force actual and
informed consideration of the question by the jury. It is believed that
the greatest opportunity for improvement in the field under discussion
lies in that phase of the matter which is only touched upon here.
